When do institutional transfers work? The Transplant Effect revisited: 24th Annual Conference of the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE)

Most economists agree that institutions are important for economic development, but little is known of why institutional transplants have been largely disappointing. Berkowitz et al. (2001) have argued that because of what they call the transplant effect, imported law lacks effectiveness when confronted with local legal norms. Successful adaptation of the imported institutions seems to mitigate the transplant effect and explain some of the variations of its effect, but comprehensive qualitative evidence has yet to be provided. This paper investigates the transplant effect on the Kanuri of Bornu, a larger ethnic group in northeastern Nigeria. Institutions transferred during colonial rule and the early years of independence have been largely ineffective in Bornu. Why did the Kanuri suffer from a transplant effect, while the Tswana – similar in size and ethnic homogeneity - did not? The paper uses new institutional economics as a theoretical framework to discuss the transplant effect. Although contextual in nature, the findings demonstrate the necessity of cultural adaptation of imported institutions. In the case of the Bornu, the lack of an educated bureaucratic class and strong political leadership around independence as well as generally low levels of education and urbanization seemed to have contributed to the transplant effect.