Abstract (may include machine translation)
It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the problem of non-existence, despite what some philosophers say.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 417-434 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Philosophia (United States) |
Volume | 40 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Being
- Existence
- Intentionality
- Meinong
- Negative existentials
- Non-existence
- Noneism