Updating evolutionary epistemology

This chapter critically analyzes evolutionary epistemology as a theoretical
framework for the study of science as a historical and cultural phenomenon.
As spelled out by Campbell in the 1970s, evolutionary epistemology has an
ambitious goal: it aims at understanding the complex relations between bio-
logical evolution, especially the biological evolution of human cognition, and
the cultural evolution of scientific knowledge. It eventually aims at forming
an integrated causal theory of the evolution of science, starting with the evo-
lution of human cognition. In this chapter, the author considers Campbell’s
project and specifies why it is still today a worthwhile project for explain-
ing the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. But he
also criticizes Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology for assuming that blind
variation and selective retention are the processes through which science
evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odds with much of what
we know about scientific cognition and the history of science. He advocates
(1) dropping the methodological constraint of looking for processes of blind
variation and selective retention at the expense of other constructive processes
and mechanisms of knowledge production; but (2) retaining the integrative
point of evolutionary epistemology, which implies taking seriously the results
of evolutionary psychology; and (3) retaining the populational framework
for explaining the history of science, which means questioning why some
scientific beliefs and practices eventually spread and stabilize in a scientific community. We end up with an updated research program for evolutionary
epistemology, which faces new challenges.