Abstract (may include machine translation)
A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 269-284 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 160 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2008 |
Keywords
- Indexicals
- Philosophy of time
- Truth conditions for tensed sentences