Abstract (may include machine translation)
Concerns about the under-representation of female academic philosophers and about the stereotype that philosophy is best done by men have recently led to efforts to make academic philosophy a more inclusive discipline. An example is the Gendered Conference Campaign, encouraging event organisers and volume editors to include women amongst invited speakers and authors. Initiatives such as the GCC raise worries about tokenism. Potential invitees may be concerned about unfairness towards whose who would have been invited in their place in the absence of affirmative action and about the way in which affirmative action can (be perceived to) affect the quality of the conference or volume in question. And women philosophers often worry that, if formal rules or significant social pressures towards gender inclusiveness play a role in selection processes, their achievements will be discounted. I argue there is no good reason for these fears: there is no pure meritocracy in academia, nor is the ideal of pure meritocracy either feasible or desirable. There are several legitimate grounds - independent of professional competence - for including people in positions of visibility and prestige; gender is such a legitimate reason.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 163-176 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Journal of Applied Philosophy |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 May 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |