Abstract (may include machine translation)
This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism - which is not adopted here - but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Number of pages | 232 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191710629 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199230327 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2009 |
Keywords
- Cartesian
- Externalism
- Externalist
- Internalism
- Internalist
- Mind
- Phenomenal properties
- Privileged access
- Self-knowledge