Abstract (may include machine translation)
The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as the two horns of a dilemma. The causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are physical.2 One may avoid this dilemma by adopting an epiphenomenalist view of consciousness, of course; but there is little independent reason for believing such a view. Rejecting epiphenomenalism, then, leaves contemporary philosophers with their problem: mental causation inclines them towards physicalism, while consciousness inclines them towards dualism.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The History of the Mind-Body Problem |
Editors | Tim Crane, Sarah Patterson |
Publisher | Routledge Taylor & Francis Group |
Number of pages | 26 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780203471029 |
State | Published - 2000 |
Externally published | Yes |