The making of rivals and strange bedfellows: Patterns of Turkish and Russian security assistance in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars

In the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, Russia and Turkey emerged as two principal players providing security assistance to opposing warring parties. While interventions on the part of the two foreign powers have introduced new dynamics into intractable and volatile armed conflicts, the underlying intention was to inject extraneous goals into ongoing conflicts and project power in the southern Mediterranean region. This article investigates security assistance theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we propose a typology that distinguishes between formal, informal and semi-formal processes of wartime security assistance across the state-non-state dimension. Empirically, drawing on rare access to state officials, former and active rebels, as well as mercenary actors in Syria and Libya, we give a unique description of the patterns of security assistance provided by Russia and Turkey to state and non-state armed actors. We examine the ways in which the two foreign powers have created a nexus between the two conflicts by capitalizing on pre-existing security assistance frameworks in Syria to recruit and deploy fighters to Libya. Although security assistance has emerged as a competition site between Russia and Turkey, we demonstrate how mutual recognition of security interests has created margins for negotiation and agreement-reaching in Syria and Libya.