The Lives of Others

Katalin Farkas

doi:10.1093/arisup/akad009

The Lives of Others

Katalin Farkas

Department of Philosophy

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Abstract (may include machine translation)

On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	104-121
Number of pages	18
Journal	Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
Volume	97
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akad009
State	Published - 2023

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abstract = "On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as {\textquoteleft}you{\textquoteright} while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.",

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The Lives of Others

Abstract (may include machine translation)

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