The Intentional Structure of Consciousness

Tim Crane*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. One feels a pain in one’s leg to be in the leg, not in the mind. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the first is not. And we also distinguish mental pain (which is normally understood as some kind of emotional distress) from the physical pain one feels in one’s body.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConsciousness
Subtitle of host publicationNew Philosophical Perspectives
EditorsAleksandar Jokic, Quentin Smith
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages33-56
Number of pages24
ISBN (Electronic)9781383037470
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2003
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • distinguish
  • genuine
  • mind
  • Something
  • sometimes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The Intentional Structure of Consciousness'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this