The fog of border: The fragmentation of the European Union's border policies

The European Union (EU) has developed a number of frameworks and instruments related to the management of its external borders, which have stimulated a substantial scholarly interest (Carrera 2007; Marenin 2010; Wolff 2010; Zapata-Barrero 2010). The number of border management tools has substantially expanded and includes simple fences and more sophisticated optical and electro-optical sensors, information technology (IT) intrusion detection systems, biometrical and patterns sensors and systems, manned and unmanned aircrafts, as well as intelligent surveillance means. Altogether, the border management security market amounts to C22 billion in the US and C10 billion in Europe. In addition, a multitude of ‘stakeholders’ has largely expanded to include not only traditional border management actors (e.g. the DG Justice and the DG Home Affairs in the European Commission, Interpol, Europol or the Customs Cooperation Working Party), but also the European Union AntiFraud Office (OLAF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), the European Defence Agency (EDA) or the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF). Operational cooperation on border management is mostly structured around the activities of the European Patrol Network and the External Borders Agency Frontex (joint operations, Focal Points, Rapid Border Intervention Teams, risk analysis, training, technical assistance to Member States), which is the focus of the next chapter. The implementation of these measures is supported through the use of burden-sharing tools like the Schengen Facility (e.g. C400 million for Romania and Bulgaria in 2007-2009) and the External Border Fund, which amounts to C1.82 billion for the period 2007-2013, the major part of which is distributed among Member States depending on their burden regarding external border controls and visa policy. Several new legislative proposals are in the making concerning, among others, the amendment of the Schengen Borders Code, setting up an Entry Exit System (EES) and a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), as well as the start of operations of the Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). These developments give rise to an intricate system for the defence of the EU’s realm where the construction of the border depends on its dislocation, both political and spatial. The three clusters of border policy repertoires described in this chapter, surveillance, smart borders and integrated border management, epitomise the emerging practice the EU has engaged in. They reflect the ‘pushing-out of borders’ in two distinctive ways: through technological devices and a particular relationship with the neighbour. The latter relies on attempts to prevent the border-related threat from entering the EU’s realm by shifting increasing responsibility to contain it onto the neighbour. This move is accompanied by conditionality (e.g. the pressure towards readmission tied with the promises of visa facilitation) and the projection of the EU political and social model geared at a systemic reform of the neighbour. A quote from the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) reflects the rationale underpinning this logic: ‘The quality of our democracy and public confidence in the Union will depend to a large extent on our ability to guarantee security and stability in Europe and to work with our neighbours and partners to address the root causes of the internal security problems faced by the EU’ (European Council 2010b: 9). Here the externally assisted reform, most explicitly in our case integrated border management and security sector reform, turn into modern state-building.1.