TY - JOUR
T1 - The Effect of Austerity Packages on Government Popularity During the Great Recession
AU - Bojar, Abel
AU - Bremer, Björn
AU - Kriesi, Hanspeter
AU - Wang, Chendi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Cambridge University Press.
PY - 2022/1/21
Y1 - 2022/1/21
N2 - During the Great Recession, governments across the continent implemented austerity policies. A large literature claims that such policies are surprisingly popular and have few electoral costs. This article revisits this question by studying the popularity of governments during the economic crisis. The authors assemble a pooled time-series data set for monthly support for ruling parties from fifteen European countries and treat austerity packages as intervention variables to the underlying popularity series. Using time-series analysis, this permits the careful tracking of the impact of austerity packages over time. The main empirical contributions are twofold. First, the study shows that, on average, austerity packages hurt incumbent parties in opinion polls. Secondly, it demonstrates that the magnitude of this electoral punishment is contingent on the economic and political context: in instances of rising unemployment, the involvement of external creditors and high protest intensity, the cumulative impact of austerity on government popularity becomes considerable.
AB - During the Great Recession, governments across the continent implemented austerity policies. A large literature claims that such policies are surprisingly popular and have few electoral costs. This article revisits this question by studying the popularity of governments during the economic crisis. The authors assemble a pooled time-series data set for monthly support for ruling parties from fifteen European countries and treat austerity packages as intervention variables to the underlying popularity series. Using time-series analysis, this permits the careful tracking of the impact of austerity packages over time. The main empirical contributions are twofold. First, the study shows that, on average, austerity packages hurt incumbent parties in opinion polls. Secondly, it demonstrates that the magnitude of this electoral punishment is contingent on the economic and political context: in instances of rising unemployment, the involvement of external creditors and high protest intensity, the cumulative impact of austerity on government popularity becomes considerable.
KW - austerity
KW - economic crisis
KW - economic voting
KW - fiscal consolidation
KW - government popularity
KW - time series analysis
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099818976&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0007123420000472
DO - 10.1017/S0007123420000472
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85099818976
SN - 0007-1234
VL - 52
SP - 181
EP - 199
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
IS - 1
ER -