The boundaries of the mind

Katalin Farkas*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

The subject of mental processes or mental states is usually assumed to be an individual, and hence the boundaries of mental features - in a strict or metaphorical sense - are naturally regarded as reaching no further than the boundaries of the individual. This chapter addresses various philosophical developments in the 20th and 21st century that questioned this natural assumption. The author has not addressed Freud in this chapter because Freud and psychoanalysis have had remarkably little effect on mainstream analytic philosophy, compared, for example, to continental philosophy, where Freud had much more of an influence, and compared to the rest of intellectual life and culture. Most naturalist-physicalist theories of the mind rely on some version of functionalism, broadly understood. Central to this conception is the idea that what makes something a particular mental state depends on the role it plays in a cognitive system, but not on the physical constitution of the piece of machinery that realizes this role.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries
Subtitle of host publicationThe History of the Philosophy of Mind
EditorsAmy Kind
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages256-279
Number of pages24
Volume6
ISBN (Electronic)9780429019395
ISBN (Print)9781138243972
DOIs
StatePublished - 2018

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