Teleological understanding of actions

Gergely Csibra, György Gergely

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

An observed behavior is interpreted as an action directed to a particular end state if it is judged to be the most efficient means available to the agent for achieving this goal in the given environment. When such an interpretation is established, it creates a teleological representation of the action, which is held together by the principle of efficiency. The paradigmatic situation in which the functioning of teleological interpretation can be tested is when one observes a behavior (e.g., an agent jumps into the air while moving in a certain direction) leading to an end state (e.g., the agent stops next to another object). If, and only if, the behavior (jumping) is justified by environmental factors (by the presence of a barrier over which the jumping occurs) will this behavior be interpreted as a means action to achieve the end state as the goal of the action (to get in contact with the other object). Researchers have published extensive evidence that infants from at least six months of age form this kind of teleological representations of actions. This chapter attempts to clarify commonly raised issues about this theory in a question-and-answer format.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNavigating the social world
Subtitle of host publicationWhat infants, children, and other species can teach us
EditorsMR Banaji, SA Gelman
Place of PublicationNew York, New York
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages38-43
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)978-0-19-989071-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Publication series

NameOxford series in social cognition and social neuroscience.
PublisherOxford University Press

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Teleological understanding of actions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this