Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naïve theory of rational action

György Gergely*, Gergely Csibra

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the 'teleological stance' to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance - a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)287-292
Number of pages6
JournalTrends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume7
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2003
Externally publishedYes

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