Abstract (may include machine translation)
Top-level presidential advisor appointments provide would-be autocrats in backsliding democracies a quick and effective means to coopt elites and assemble an authoritarian coalition. Such appointments represent a mechanism for making promises of patronage that are more credible and more directly under the executive’s control than patronage facilitated by their party. Elites who join the executive’s coalition via such appointments have incentives to maintain their privileged access and therefore are more likely to match or even surpass the authoritarian sentiment of an autocratic executive. This research uses a sentiment analysis model trained with 2 years of Twitter data—between 2019 and 2021—to compare the authoritarian sentiment of Turkey’s major political parties and to examine differences between groups within Turkey’s ruling party. The evidence shows that President Erdogan’s advisors are significantly more authoritarian than the rest of the party, and, as such, they form an authoritarian vanguard within an already authoritarian party.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 379-386 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Party Politics |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Feb 2023 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Twitter sentiment analysis
- authoritarian coalition
- democratic backsliding