Strategic incentives in unconventional electoral systems: Introduction to the special issue

Daniel Bochsler*, Julian Bernauer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalRepresentation
Volume50
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes

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