Sainsbury sobre pensar acerca de un objeto

Translated title of the contribution: Sainsbury on thinking about an object

Tim Crane*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Abstract (may include machine translation)

La explicación que ofrece R.M. Sainsbury de la referencia tiene muchas características convincentes y atractivas, pero tiene la consecuencia indeseable de que oraciones de la forma “x está pensando acerca de y” nunca pueden ser verdaderas cuando se reemplaza y con un término no referencial. De las dos maneras obvias de tratar este problema dentro del marco teórico de Sainsbury, rechazo una (el análisis de pensar acerca de como una actitud proposicional) y acepto la otra (que trata “pensar acerca de” como semejante a un verbo intensional transitivo). Aceptar esta última también cae dentro del espíritu de la explicación de la referencia ofrecida por Sainsbury. 





R.M. Sainsbury's account of reference has many compelling and attractive features. But it has the undesirable consequence that sentences of the form "x is thinking about y" can never be true when y is replaced by a non-referring term. Of the two obvious ways to deal with this problem within Sainsbury's framework, I reject one (the analysis of thinking about as a propositional attitude) and endorse the other (treating "thinks about" as akin to an intensional transitive verb). This endorsement is also within the spirit of Sainsbury's account of reference.

Translated title of the contributionSainsbury on thinking about an object
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)85-95
Number of pages11
JournalCritica-Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia
Volume40
Issue number120
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2008
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Empty names
  • Intensional transitives
  • Propositional attitudes
  • Propositionalism
  • Reference

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