Reconceiving Murdochian Realism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

It can be tempting to read Iris Murdoch as subscribing to the same position as standard contemporary moral realists. Her language is often similar to theirs and they share some key commitments, most importantly the rejection of the fact-value di-chotomy. However, it is a mistake to assume that her realism amounts to the same thing theirs does. In this paper I offer a sketch of her alternative conception of real-ism, which centres on the idea that truth and reality are fundamentally ethical con-cepts. For Murdoch, I suggest, realism is a matter of doing justice to the objects one is confronted with—something that cannot be understood except in ethical terms.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number23
Pages (from-to)649-672
Number of pages24
JournalErgo-an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Volume10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023

Keywords

  • Iris Murdoch
  • Moral objectivity
  • Moral realism
  • Truth

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Reconceiving Murdochian Realism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this