Abstract (may include machine translation)
The paper distinguishes two senses of freedom. In one sense, freedom is the aim of human action; in another, it is a precondition of the possibility of moral evaluation of actions. I argue that virtuous actions manifest the exertion of rational capacities and that they require alternative possibilities in the sense of the ability to act otherwise. Hence freedom understood as the condition of exerting rational capacities is a metaphysical concept. It is also argued that abilities are not dispositions and that the traditional conditional analysis of free will captures well the sense of ability that is needed for the possibility of rational and virtuous behavior.
Translated title of the contribution | Rational capacities and metaphysical freedom |
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Original language | Hungarian |
Pages (from-to) | 11-25 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Magyar Filozófiai Szemle |
Volume | 60 |
Issue number | 2 |
State | Published - 2016 |