Proportionality in Liquid Democracy and Representative Democracy

Leyla Ade; Matteo Michelini; Pietro  Vigiani

doi:10.21942/uva.20367702

Proportionality in Liquid Democracy and Representative Democracy

Leyla Ade
, Matteo Michelini
, Pietro Vigiani

University of Bayreuth
Eindhoven University of Technology
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa

Research output: Contribution to conference types › Paper › peer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

In this paper, we compare liquid democracy to representative
democracy with respect to a proportionality principle, according to which agents with higher stakes should have more voting weight. We provide a formal model of voting systems that models agents’ uncertainty towards a voting issue as influenced by stakes in the issue. We formalise the delegation process in representative democracy and liquid democracy and prove that only the latter satisfies the proportionality principle.

Original language	English
Pages	1-14
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.21942/uva.20367702
State	Published - 25 Jul 2022
Externally published	Yes
Event	ESSLLI 33rd European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information: ESSLLI Student Session - National University of Ireland Galway, Galway, Ireland Duration: 8 Aug 2022 → 19 Aug 2022 Conference number: 33 https://2022.esslli.eu

Workshop

Workshop	ESSLLI 33rd European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information
Country/Territory	Ireland
City	Galway
Period	8/08/22 → 19/08/22
Internet address	https://2022.esslli.eu

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

Computational social choice
Formal political theory
Liquid democracy
Representative Democracy
Proportionality

Access to Document

10.21942/uva.20367702License: CC BY

Vigiani-Pietro1_ 2022Publisher version, 357 KBLicense: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "Proportionality in Liquid Democracy and Representative Democracy",

abstract = "In this paper, we compare liquid democracy to representative democracy with respect to a proportionality principle, according to which agents with higher stakes should have more voting weight. We provide a formal model of voting systems that models agents{\textquoteright} uncertainty towards a voting issue as influenced by stakes in the issue. We formalise the delegation process in representative democracy and liquid democracy and prove that only the latter satisfies the proportionality principle.",

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AU - Ade, Leyla

AU - Michelini, Matteo

AU - Vigiani, Pietro

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Y1 - 2022/7/25

N2 - In this paper, we compare liquid democracy to representative democracy with respect to a proportionality principle, according to which agents with higher stakes should have more voting weight. We provide a formal model of voting systems that models agents’ uncertainty towards a voting issue as influenced by stakes in the issue. We formalise the delegation process in representative democracy and liquid democracy and prove that only the latter satisfies the proportionality principle.

AB - In this paper, we compare liquid democracy to representative democracy with respect to a proportionality principle, according to which agents with higher stakes should have more voting weight. We provide a formal model of voting systems that models agents’ uncertainty towards a voting issue as influenced by stakes in the issue. We formalise the delegation process in representative democracy and liquid democracy and prove that only the latter satisfies the proportionality principle.

KW - Computational social choice

KW - Formal political theory

KW - Liquid democracy

KW - Representative Democracy

KW - Proportionality

U2 - 10.21942/uva.20367702

DO - 10.21942/uva.20367702

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T2 - ESSLLI 33rd European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information

Y2 - 8 August 2022 through 19 August 2022

ER -

Proportionality in Liquid Democracy and Representative Democracy

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Workshop

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this