Abstract (may include machine translation)
The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 855-870 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Nous |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2017 |