Abstract (may include machine translation)
The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 855-870 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Nous |
Volume | 51 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2017 |