Practical Know-Wh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)855-870
Number of pages16
JournalNous
Volume51
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2017

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