Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries

Miklós Koren; Cecília Hornok; Ádám Szeidl

Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries

Miklós Koren, Cecília Hornok, Ádám Szeidl

Institute of Economics

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report types › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

During 1996–2013 in Hungary, the budget deficit as a share of GDP was on average 3.7 percentage points higher in election years than in the middle of the electoral cycle. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, government budgets moved much less with the electoral cycle. About 55% of the increase in the Hungarian deficit came from higher expenditures, while 45% came from lower revenues. The increase in expenditures was concentrated in investments, benefits and transfers,
components which are likely to be visible to voters. These results are consistent with
a moral-hazard based model of political budget cycles and suggest that Hungary’s
political institutions are weaker than those of the other three Visegrad countries.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Incentives, Predictions, Volumes, Prices
Subtitle of host publication	essays commemorating the 20th anniversary of the first graduating class at CEU Economics
Editors	Gábor Kézdi
Place of Publication	Budapest
Publisher	Central European University, Department of Economics
Pages	27-38
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	9789638982230
State	Published - 2014

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Koren, M., Hornok, C., & Szeidl, Á. (2014). Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries. In G. Kézdi (Ed.), Incentives, Predictions, Volumes, Prices: essays commemorating the 20th anniversary of the first graduating class at CEU Economics (pp. 27-38). Central European University, Department of Economics. https://oszkdk.oszk.hu/storage/00/01/19/01/dd/1/Final.pdf

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Koren, M, Hornok, C & Szeidl, Á 2014, Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries. in G Kézdi (ed.), Incentives, Predictions, Volumes, Prices: essays commemorating the 20th anniversary of the first graduating class at CEU Economics. Central European University, Department of Economics, Budapest, pp. 27-38. <https://oszkdk.oszk.hu/storage/00/01/19/01/dd/1/Final.pdf>

Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries. / Koren, Miklós; Hornok, Cecília; Szeidl, Ádám.
Incentives, Predictions, Volumes, Prices: essays commemorating the 20th anniversary of the first graduating class at CEU Economics. ed. / Gábor Kézdi. Budapest: Central European University, Department of Economics, 2014. p. 27-38.

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report types › Chapter › peer-review

TY - CHAP

T1 - Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries

AU - Koren, Miklós

AU - Hornok, Cecília

AU - Szeidl, Ádám

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - During 1996–2013 in Hungary, the budget deficit as a share of GDP was on average 3.7 percentage points higher in election years than in the middle of the electoral cycle. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, government budgets moved much less with the electoral cycle. About 55% of the increase in the Hungarian deficit came from higher expenditures, while 45% came from lower revenues. The increase in expenditures was concentrated in investments, benefits and transfers,components which are likely to be visible to voters. These results are consistent witha moral-hazard based model of political budget cycles and suggest that Hungary’spolitical institutions are weaker than those of the other three Visegrad countries.

AB - During 1996–2013 in Hungary, the budget deficit as a share of GDP was on average 3.7 percentage points higher in election years than in the middle of the electoral cycle. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, government budgets moved much less with the electoral cycle. About 55% of the increase in the Hungarian deficit came from higher expenditures, while 45% came from lower revenues. The increase in expenditures was concentrated in investments, benefits and transfers,components which are likely to be visible to voters. These results are consistent witha moral-hazard based model of political budget cycles and suggest that Hungary’spolitical institutions are weaker than those of the other three Visegrad countries.

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M3 - Chapter

SN - 9789638982230

SP - 27

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BT - Incentives, Predictions, Volumes, Prices

A2 - Kézdi, Gábor

PB - Central European University, Department of Economics

CY - Budapest

ER -

Political Budget Cycles in Hungary and the Visegrad Countries

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