Mental fact and mental fiction

Tim Crane*, Katalin Farkas

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

It is common to distinguish between conscious mental episodes and standing mental states – those mental features like beliefs, desires or intentions, which a subject can have even if she is not conscious, or when her consciousness is occupied with something else. This paper presents a view of standing mental states according to which these states are less real than episodes of consciousness. It starts from the usual view that states like beliefs and desires are not directly present to the mind, but are posited to explain thought and behaviour. Ascriptions of these states are attempts to model a subject’s “Worldview”: the totality of their cognitive, conative and affective dispositions. When ascribing standing states, we often significantly simplify the complexity of the Worldview. This simplification is a feature of models in general. The Worldview is also distinguished from the “Habitus” – the totality of dispositions that are associated with character traits. As with the Worldview, modelling the Habitus should be treated as a useful simplification of a very complex reality. It is argued that although these models have some similarities with fictions, these similarities are outweighed by the dissimilarities.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMental Fictionalism
Subtitle of host publicationPhilosophical Explorations
EditorsTamás Demeter, T. Parent, Adam Toon
PublisherTaylor and Francis Inc.
Pages303-319
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781003091073
ISBN (Print)9780367548957
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022

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