MacBride on truth in truthmaking

Matthew Simpson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview Articlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Fraser MacBride has argued that deflationism about truth makes the truthmaker principle, that every truth has a truthmaker, implausible. This is because on a deflationary view, the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of a conjunction of claims which have no independent motivation. In this article, I argue that this claim is false: deflationism does not entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of such a conjunction, because the claims MacBride focuses on are in fact irrelevant to the motivations for truthmaker theory. Moreover, deflationists can consistently articulate and accept such motivations. Deflationism has no bearing on the plausibility of the truthmaker principle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)19-26
Number of pages8
JournalAnalysis
Volume76
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • MacBride
  • Truthmaking
  • deflationism
  • truthmaker principle

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'MacBride on truth in truthmaking'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this