Abstract (may include machine translation)
Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 739-759 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2 Nov 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Distributive justice
- care
- duty to love
- feasibility
- love
- metric of justice