Logic and the boundaries of animal mentality

Glock has emphasised in his recent writings on animals the intelligence of some animals, the intentionality that characterises many of their actions, and other features that show the affinity between their mentality and action and ours. While granting these observations, I try to identify elements of our mental capacities that separate us from animals. I focus on our command of logical concepts, demonstrable already in children in the second or third year of their life, which to date no animal has been shown to master. I draw various conclusions about the behavioural, intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities that depend on this mastery, and discuss recent empirical research that either supports or apparently disagrees with the claim that animals, even those we consider intelligent, are limited in these respects. My discussion is built around observations extracted from Wittgenstein, a major influence on Glock’s philosophy, as well as mine.