Abstract (may include machine translation)
The concluding chapter provides an in-depth analysis of Polish constitutional history from the late eighteenth century to the present, highlighting two distinct patterns of constitution-making: constitutional opportunism, where constitutions are used to solidify temporary political advantages; and constitutional accord, which aims to establish institutional rules embraced by all major political actors. The Polish constitutions of 1791, 1935, and 1997 are examined as examples of constitutional opportunism, while the decentralization reforms of the early 1990s serve as a successful case of constitutional accord. The chapter concludes by stressing that, in assessing the stability of a constitutional arrangement, output legitimacy-rather than process legitimacy-is ultimately more decisive.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Let's Agree on Poland |
| Subtitle of host publication | A Case Study in Strategic Constitutional Design |
| Editors | Maciej Kisilowski, Anna Wojciuk |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 283-301 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198979531 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198979562 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2025 |
Keywords
- constitutional accord
- constitutional history
- constitutional opportunity
- decentralization
- legitimacy
- local government
- social contract