Abstract (may include machine translation)
Know-wh (knowing what, where, etc.) ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know-wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh (even if it is not sufficient). This paper challenges this assumption by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge-that of an answer, for example, in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind Hypothesis.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 109-122 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - 2016 |