Justification and epistemic agency

Phyllis Pearson

doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04115-4

Justification and epistemic agency

Phyllis Pearson^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

University of British Columbia

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

This paper presents a novel account of what motivates internalism about justification in light of recent attempts to undermine the intuitions long thought to favour it (Srinivasan in Philos Rev 129:395–431, 2020). On the account I propose, internalist intuitions are sensitive to epistemic agency. Internalist intuitions track a desire to acknowledge the epistemic agency one has in virtue of being in a position to meet the standards one is accountable to.

Original language	English
Article number	127
Journal	Synthese
Volume	201
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04115-4
State	Published - 27 Mar 2023
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Epistemic agency
Epistemic justification
Epistemic normativity
Internalism
The new evil demon problem

Access to Document

10.1007/s11229-023-04115-4

Cite this

@article{4da34bfdac8149a9a8cca1a607254500,

title = "Justification and epistemic agency",

abstract = "This paper presents a novel account of what motivates internalism about justification in light of recent attempts to undermine the intuitions long thought to favour it (Srinivasan in Philos Rev 129:395–431, 2020). On the account I propose, internalist intuitions are sensitive to epistemic agency. Internalist intuitions track a desire to acknowledge the epistemic agency one has in virtue of being in a position to meet the standards one is accountable to.",

keywords = "Epistemic agency, Epistemic justification, Epistemic normativity, Internalism, The new evil demon problem",

author = "Phyllis Pearson",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.",

year = "2023",

month = mar,

day = "27",

doi = "10.1007/s11229-023-04115-4",

language = "English",

volume = "201",

journal = "Synthese",

issn = "0039-7857",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Justification and epistemic agency

AU - Pearson, Phyllis

PY - 2023/3/27

Y1 - 2023/3/27

N2 - This paper presents a novel account of what motivates internalism about justification in light of recent attempts to undermine the intuitions long thought to favour it (Srinivasan in Philos Rev 129:395–431, 2020). On the account I propose, internalist intuitions are sensitive to epistemic agency. Internalist intuitions track a desire to acknowledge the epistemic agency one has in virtue of being in a position to meet the standards one is accountable to.

AB - This paper presents a novel account of what motivates internalism about justification in light of recent attempts to undermine the intuitions long thought to favour it (Srinivasan in Philos Rev 129:395–431, 2020). On the account I propose, internalist intuitions are sensitive to epistemic agency. Internalist intuitions track a desire to acknowledge the epistemic agency one has in virtue of being in a position to meet the standards one is accountable to.

KW - Epistemic agency

KW - Epistemic justification

KW - Epistemic normativity

KW - Internalism

KW - The new evil demon problem

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85151125250&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-023-04115-4

DO - 10.1007/s11229-023-04115-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85151125250

SN - 0039-7857

VL - 201

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

IS - 4

M1 - 127

ER -

Justification and epistemic agency

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Correction to: Justification and epistemic agency

Cite this