Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony

Cathy Mason*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Recent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1125-1134
Number of pages10
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Volume30
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2022
Externally publishedYes

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