Abstract (may include machine translation)
In recent years there has been considerable debate over whether all mental states are intentional; in particular, over whether all conscious mental states are intentional or entirely intentional. This article uses the term intentionalism for the general thesis that the nature of a conscious mental state is determined by its intentionality. (Intentionalism is sometimes called representationalism; the difference is purely terminological.) There are a number of ways of developing this general thesis; this article examines two of them. One is the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by its intentional or representational content. The other is the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by (what the article calls) its entire intentional nature. The article argues for the superiority of the second view over the first.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191577154 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199262618 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2 Sep 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Conscious character
- Intentionalism
- Mental states
- Philosophy of mind
- Representationalism
- State of mind