Intentionalism

Tim Crane*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

In recent years there has been considerable debate over whether all mental states are intentional; in particular, over whether all conscious mental states are intentional or entirely intentional. This article uses the term intentionalism for the general thesis that the nature of a conscious mental state is determined by its intentionality. (Intentionalism is sometimes called representationalism; the difference is purely terminological.) There are a number of ways of developing this general thesis; this article examines two of them. One is the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by its intentional or representational content. The other is the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by (what the article calls) its entire intentional nature. The article argues for the superiority of the second view over the first.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191577154
ISBN (Print)9780199262618
DOIs
StatePublished - 2 Sep 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Conscious character
  • Intentionalism
  • Mental states
  • Philosophy of mind
  • Representationalism
  • State of mind

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