Independent Intentional Objects

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional object of a sensory experience must be Independent; that is, an intentional object must be such that its existence doesn’t depend on being experienced (except in some very special cases). This means, for example, that sense-data understood as mind-dependent objects are not intentional objects, because their existence depends on the occurrence of an experience. In the second part of the paper, I will sketch a view of how sensory experiences can acquire an Independent object.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Analytical Way
EditorsTadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, Olga Poller, Jan Wolenski
Place of PublicationLondon
PublisherCollege Publications
Pages149-165
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9781848900141
StatePublished - 2010

Publication series

NameStudies in Logic. Logic and Cognitive Systems

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Independent Intentional Objects'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this