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In this paper I argue that we need to distinguish two questions often conflated in discussions about the nature of intentional action. The question about the nature of action concerns the distinction between those episodes in our life that arc actions and those that are not. According to an influential tradition in the philosophy of action, the nature of action should be understood with reference to how the agent understands her own behavior. Anscombe and her followers try to cash out the nature of action in terms of the agents' first-person practical knowledge. Davidson and his followers argue that this account needs to be supplemented with a causal criterion, according to which in order to act intentionally, agents' reason must cause their action. This criterion is potentially available only from a third-person point of view, if at all. I argue that both types of accounts fail to grasp the distinguishing feature of intentional action and agency. Instead, I suggest following a proposal by Jennifer Hornsby, according to which actions should be understood as manifestations of agent-relevant abilities and capacities. I argue that although such an account is neither causal nor does it require practical knowledge, it can explain well the possibility of practical self-interpretation.