Gyakorlati racionalitás és akaratgyengeség

The paper argues that the capacity of practical rationality can be best captured by investigating the conditions under which we would regard human behavior irrational. Akrasia occurs when agents act against a judgment which is the consequence of their practical reasoning. The paper claims that this view of akrasia can help to explain what we mean by practical rationality as a capacity to control behavior by forming judgments about the value of an action in concrete situations. Practical rationality does not require that agents do what they judge best, since in many cases such a judgement is not available. Rather, practical rationality requires that if judgments based on practical reasoning were available, the agent's actual behavior wouldn't contradict its content. Contrary to some recent opinions, actions not controlled by the agents' judgements cannot be practicaly rational because they fail to satisfy the control requirement. Finally, we must understand weakness of the will as some failure of practical rationality because agents are weak-willed only if they revise their intentions without having sufficient reasons for such revision.