From Constructive Ambiguity to Harmonious Interpretation: Religion-Related Provisions in the Tunisian Constitution

Markus Böckenförde*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

In the wake of social movements that have started almost 5 years ago, citizens across North Africa have protested for the end of authoritarian leadership and demanded constitutional reforms. In a region where hopes fostered by the Arab Spring have ended in civil war, stagnation, and new forms of dictatorship, Tunisia—despite all the challenges it still faces—gives the appearance of an island of relative stability. Its inclusive and participatory constitution-building process was remarkable, overcoming political divisions in a highly divided National Constituent Assembly and successfully ending in an agreement on a compromise text, adopted in January 2014. However, the new constitution was heavily criticized by some analysts, claiming that a number of its provisions were considered irreconcilable and contradictory, notably those relating to religion and the state. The vagueness of certain of its provisions would allow lawyers and politicians to interpret it however they see fit. Against the background of these statements, the article pursues two objectives: First, it demonstrates that the constitution provides an institutional setting which prevents arbitrary readings of the constitutional text by lawyers and politicians. Second, it argues that the text can and actually shall be interpreted in a reconcilable manner without significant legal contradictions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)919-940
Number of pages22
JournalAmerican Behavioral Scientist
Volume60
Issue number8
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Tunisia
  • constitution making
  • constitutional court
  • religion

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