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Freedom and relational equality

  • University of Vienna

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Relational egalitarians defend a social arrangement ensuring that individuals can relate to each other with mutual respect as equal members of society. This equal standing is required also by the republican conception of freedom, which is therefore commonly endorsed by relational egalitarians. But while capturing egalitarian concerns might make republican freedom an attractive ideal, it prevents it from performing a useful role in the formulation of relational egalitarianism. When we develop the ideal of relational equality, we are better served by a conception of negative freedom defined without egalitarian or other evaluative terms. Negative freedom turns out to be especially important as a component of the respect between individuals that lies at the core of relational egalitarianism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)25-44
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume183
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2026
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Negative freedom
  • Relational egalitarianism
  • Republican freedom
  • Respect
  • Value of freedom

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