Fogalmi igazságok

Translated title of the contribution: Conceptual truths

Huoranszki Ferenc*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

The relation between analytic and modal truth is a widely discussed problem in many con-Temporary accounts of conceptual truths. According to some accounts, conceptual necessity is distinct from metaphysical necessity; while according to others, every necessary truth is conceptual. Despite such disagreement, both accounts assume that conceptual truths must at least be knowable a priori. This paper argues for a meta-semantic theory of conceptual truth. The theory claims, firstly, that entailment is primarily a relation between properties in the sense that the instantiation of some property entails the instantiation of others; secondly, that such entailment relations may or may not be knowable a priori; and thirdly, that a proposition expresses a conceptual truth if it aims to express a necessary truth grounded in such entailment relations.

Translated title of the contributionConceptual truths
Original languageHungarian
Pages (from-to)31-50
Number of pages20
JournalAltalanos Nyelveszeti Tanulmanyok
Volume26
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2014

Keywords

  • Analytic truth
  • Conceptual truth
  • Entailment
  • Necessity
  • Real definitions

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Conceptual truths'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this