Abstract (may include machine translation)
The relation between analytic and modal truth is a widely discussed problem in many con-Temporary accounts of conceptual truths. According to some accounts, conceptual necessity is distinct from metaphysical necessity; while according to others, every necessary truth is conceptual. Despite such disagreement, both accounts assume that conceptual truths must at least be knowable a priori. This paper argues for a meta-semantic theory of conceptual truth. The theory claims, firstly, that entailment is primarily a relation between properties in the sense that the instantiation of some property entails the instantiation of others; secondly, that such entailment relations may or may not be knowable a priori; and thirdly, that a proposition expresses a conceptual truth if it aims to express a necessary truth grounded in such entailment relations.
Translated title of the contribution | Conceptual truths |
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Original language | Hungarian |
Pages (from-to) | 31-50 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Altalanos Nyelveszeti Tanulmanyok |
Volume | 26 |
Issue number | 1 |
State | Published - 2014 |
Keywords
- Analytic truth
- Conceptual truth
- Entailment
- Necessity
- Real definitions