Extracting voters from the nation: Regime-building in nineteenth-century hungary and england through electoral legislation

András Sajó

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Regimes that operate in a democratic manner without offering the possibility of changes in who rules the country represent the ultimate problem of illiberal democracies and authoritarian rule in general. The shaping of the electoral system in the 1860s and 1870s in England and Hungary was decisive for regime building. In liberal Hungary, the franchise and the electoral system were frozen because of nationalist hegemony. In consequence the governing party remained in power until the collapse of the country in 1918. In England, accidental reform enabled in the long run adaptation to social change and rather peaceful incorporation into the electorate of the working classes, which were thought in Hungary in the 1860s as dangerous, risking the establishment of national minorities. The Hungarian parliamentary debate indicates the importance of comparative constitutional law for liberalism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConstitutionalism under Stress
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages271-286
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9780198864738
DOIs
StatePublished - 22 Oct 2020

Keywords

  • Comparative constitutional law
  • Electoral law
  • Hungary
  • Legal history
  • Nationalism
  • Nineteenth-century reform
  • Parliamentarism
  • Regime building
  • Social class
  • Unintended consequences

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