Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making: Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe

Daniel Strobl, Hanna Bäck, Wolfgang C. Müller, Mariyana Angelova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

This article investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to help them win re-election. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in thirteen Western European countries over twenty years. In line with previous research, the authors find that governments become less likely to introduce austerity measures as elections approach. The study introduces original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. The authors suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and can credibly shift responsibility for austerity measures to the preceding government. The empirical analyses show that these governments are most likely to strategically time austerity policies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-352
Number of pages22
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Western Europe
  • austerity reforms
  • electoral cycles
  • social policy
  • taxation policy

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