Ego utility, overconfidence, and task choice

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

This paper models behavior when a decision maker cares about and manages her self-image. In addition to having preferences over material outcomes, the agent derives "ego utility" from positive views about her ability to do well in a skill-sensitive, "ambitious," task. Although she uses Bayes' rule to update beliefs, she tends to become overconfident regarding which task is appropriate for her. If tasks are equally informative about ability, her task choice is also overconfident. If the ambitious task is more informative about ability, she might initially display underconfidence in behavior, and, if she is disappointed by her performance, later become too ambitious. People with ego utility prefer to acquire free information in smaller pieces. Applications to employee motivation and other economic settings are discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)673-707
Number of pages35
JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
Volume4
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2006
Externally publishedYes

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