Dualism, monism, physicalism

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Abstract (may include machine translation)

Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena (ontological reduction) or it must give, an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms (explanatory or conceptual reduction). There is little reason to call a view which is not reductive in either of these senses “physicalism”. If reduction is rejected, then a non-physicalist form of monism is still available, which may be called “emergentism”.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)73-85
Number of pages13
JournalMind and Society
Volume1
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2000

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