Disinformation as repression signaling: the cost of dissent in Russia

Despite growing research on transnational digital repression (TDR), the role of disinformation in targeting extraterritorial populations remains underconceptualized. This article addresses this gap by analyzing how authoritarian regimes use social media to spread ideological narratives that instill fear and amplify the costs of dissent, both at home and abroad. It argues that disinformation–defined as the deliberate manipulation of information with the intent to mislead–should be seen not only as the intentional spread of falsehoods, but also as a performative signal within TDR. Drawing on Russian state-aligned rhetoric on Telegram after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the paper utilizes a mixed-method approach to show that disinformation can signal multiple messages to multiple audiences simultaneously: delegitimization of opposition by portraying dissidents as foreign, traitorous, or unworthy of national belonging; preventive intimidation by issuing warnings or threats to deter other dissenters from speaking out; and selective co-optation of a «loyal diaspora» by elevating or praising exiles who conform, thereby modeling acceptable dissent and disciplining deviation. Thus, in an era of hyperconnectivity, autocracies can use disinformation as a multifaceted signal–both coercive and constitutive–to reshape the costs of dissent and, simultaneously, redefine national belonging.