Developing a Theory of Mind: Are Infants Sensitive to How Other People Represent the World?

A crucial question that has intrigued researchers for decades is how children arrive at an understanding that others' behavior is not only guided by the observable reality but also by their (unobservable) mental states. Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states, and its development have been of interest to many domains in cognitive science. Here we review some of the cental findings on ToM abilities in children and infants, and discuss the related theoretical proposals. We (a) introduce research on children's false-belief understanding, (b) describe why understanding that the same reality may be represented under different subjective descriptions (understanding the aspectuality of beliefs) may be a critical milestone in ToM development, (c) overview findings about infants' false-belief understanding, and (d) present evidence indicating that infants understand that another person may encode the world under a different aspect. We conclude by pointing to exciting new advancements in the field and potential directions for future research.