Abstract (may include machine translation)
The Cartesian conception of the mind replaced the Aristotelian conception of the soul. On Aristotle's view, there are two natural ways to demarcate the realm of psychological phenomena: either we consider all functions of the soul, and include not only reason, perception and emotion, but also digestion and locomotion; or we restrict ourselves to what is distinctively human, namely reason, and leave out perception, emotions and appetites. In contrast, Descartes offers a list of mental phenomena which is the same as our list. This is important, because it is more or less this list of mental features that we expect someone to have if we are to enter into an interpersonal relationship with them.
| Translated title of the contribution | Descartes and the Nature of the Human Mind |
|---|---|
| Original language | Hungarian |
| Pages (from-to) | 9-11 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | Korunk (Kolozsvár) |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 8 |
| State | Published - 2019 |