Constructing a World for the Senses

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. The chapter calls this feature ’perceptual intentionality’. The chapter argues that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic phenomenal sensory features, features that are not themselves intentional. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed from non-intentional phenomenal features of mental episodes.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhenomenal Intentionality
EditorsUriah Kriegel
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages99-115
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9780199932191
ISBN (Print)9780199764297
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

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