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Abstract (may include machine translation)
It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. The chapter calls this feature ’perceptual intentionality’. The chapter argues that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic phenomenal sensory features, features that are not themselves intentional. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed from non-intentional phenomenal features of mental episodes.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Phenomenal Intentionality |
Editors | Uriah Kriegel |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 99-115 |
Number of pages | 17 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780199932191 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199764297 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2013 |
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