Abstract (may include machine translation)
The theory of the ‘constitutional moment’ focuses on lasting constitutional arrangements that result from specific, emotionally shared responses to shared fundamental political experiences. The US, 19th century Belgium, and perhaps post-Apartheid South Africa are close to this ideal. The overwhelming majority of the constitutions that we know do not have these specificities. Constitutions serve other, more technical goals and cannot be considered as fundamental choices regarding the political design of a country. Where does the Constitution for Europe belong in terms of its future-shaping capacity? In the case of the Union Constitution it cannot be considered to be a settlement that ends of a polity shaping political tension and debate; it will be the consolidation of an existing process, setting up other open-ended processes. As a process oriented consolidation it is perhaps the best achievable modus vivendi for Europe but it does not look as a new, polity shaping arrangement. The inter-governmental political debate continues without being necessarily channeled into constitutional politics. The emerging European constitution is created without much popular or other enthusiasm and it is not going to constitutionalize ordinary politics. Lack of the blessing of a constitutional moment has its problems, among others because it is not creating union and identity.
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | New York University School of Law, Jean Monnet Center |
Pages | 1-22 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Volume | 5/04 |
State | Published - 2004 |