Abstract (may include machine translation)
Two schools dominate the literature on democracy in divided societies: consociationalism and centripetalism. The first advocates group representation and power sharing while the second recommends institutions that promote multi-ethnic parties. Although often presented as mutually exclusive choices, in reality many new democracies display a mix. Drawing on the experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland, this article examines the empirical and theoretical relationship between centripetalism and consociationalism. The aim is to explore the conditions under which they reinforce each other (friends) or work at cross-purposes (foes). A better understanding of the interaction between consociational and centripetal elements in post-conflict societies not only yields a more nuanced picture of institutional dynamics, but also holds lessons for institutional design.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 519-537 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Swiss Political Science Review |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Dec 2019 |
Keywords
- centripetalism
- consociationalism
- divided societies
- electoral system
- institutions
- power sharing
- vote pooling