Abstract (may include machine translation)
This chapter revisits the issue of the explanatory gap that is supposed to open when considering identity statements between physical and mental phenomena. It is argued that the question asked in the original formulation of the explanatory gap was this: ‘Why is this phenomenal character, rather than any other, attached to this physiological process?’. An answer is proposed to this via establishing a ‘natural fit’ between the phenomenal character of experiences and their functional roles. The chapter explains how to narrow the explanatory gap: first, identify the functional role of an experience and look for the physical process that plays this role. Then, second, note that there is a natural fit between the phenomenal character and the functional role of conscious experiences. The chapter concludes with a view which may be called Phenomenal Functionalism.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind |
Editors | Peter Anstey, David Braddon-Mitchell |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 125-142 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780191926334 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2021 |